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Key messages 

Section 1 | Material change as a consequence of takeover 
 With 100% control of Sky, Fox will be able to appoint all members of the Sky Board.  
 There would therefore be no independent directors to exercise scrutiny over Sky’s 
strategic direction or corporate culture. 
 
Section 2 | Regulatory framework and public interest grounds for referral 
 The Secretary of State has broad discretion to determine the public interest grounds on 
which the bid might be referred.  
 The proposed merger raises numerous public interest concerns, including concerns 
relating to accuracy and freedom of expression, plurality of views, and lack of 
commitment to broadcasting standards. 
 At this stage, the Secretary of State need only reach a fair assessment of whether any of 
these public interest concerns might be valid. 
 
Section 3 | Reduced plurality of news production  
 News production, already severely diminished and under further threat, would be further 
reduced by the proposed merger.   
 In particular, one organisation and ultimately one family would directly control the 
dominant commercial news producer in the UK across television, radio and print. 
 This would reinforce their dominance as news gate-keepers and their influence over 
opinion and policy formation.  
 
Section 4 | Potential for increased power and impact  
 There is long-standing historical evidence of how media power and influence has been 
exercised by the Murdoch family, which will be further enhanced by the proposed 
merger.  
 There should be four particular areas of concern: 
1) Potential impact on public opinion formation, resulting from the combination of control 
over Sky and News Corp’s continuing domination of newspaper circulation. 
2) Potential impact on broadcast news agendas, as evidenced by research and by 
senior broadcasters. 
3) Scope for greater influence on the policy making process through enhanced access 
to government and senior policy makers. 
4) Potential impact on the commercial news media environment. 

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Introduction 
 
It has now been confirmed that 21st Century Fox, the Film and TV entertainment business 
controlled by the Murdoch family, wishes to acquire the 61% share of Sky plc (formerly BSkyB) 
that it does not already own. This proposed expansion of the Murdoch media business raises 
numerous issues which would engage public interest legislation. 
21st Century Fox (Fox) was created in 2013 when Rupert Murdoch split his worldwide media 
business News Corporation into two separate entities: Fox – embracing satellite, cable, TV and 
film – and News Corporation, embracing print and online. Operation of these two entities is still 
controlled by Rupert Murdoch and his two sons: James Murdoch now runs Fox while Rupert and 
Lachlan Murdoch are joint executive chairmen of both Fox and News Corporation. 
Sky was created in 2014 when BSkyB, the UK satellite TV arm, acquired Sky Italia in Italy and 
Sky Deutschland in Germany. By virtue of Fox’s 39% stake in Sky, it was able to ensure that 
James Murdoch was reinstated as chairman in 2016 after stepping down in 2012 in the wake of 
the phone-hacking scandal. Nevertheless, because the remaining 61% of shares are not owned 
by Fox, the company is subject to scrutiny by external shareholders and independent directors 
not linked to the Murdoch family, a safeguard that will not be available when 100% ownership 
passes to Fox. In addition, full control by Fox will enhance Rupert Murdoch’s media power 
through effective control of Sky’s £12 billion annual revenues and £1.5 billion profits. 
Now that formal notification of the bid has been made to the European Commission (EC), the 
Secretary of State for Media Culture and Sport (hereinafter referred to as “Secretary of State”), 
Karen Bradley, has ten working days to make a decision on whether to issue a “public interest 
intervention notice” under the 2002 Enterprise Act, referring the bid to Ofcom on media plurality 
grounds. 
The Secretary of State confirmed in a statement to Parliament that she had already been in 
contact with Fox, and that EC and DCMS officials were involved in pre-notification discussions 
with the company. 
While interested parties may now make representations, the 10-day deadline permits only a very 
short window for such representations and public debate. This policy brief sets out the relevant 
statutory framework and processes, the public interest concerns raised by the bid, and why the 
authors believe that there is sufficient evidence to warrant independent scrutiny of the bid on 
public interest plurality grounds.  
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Section 1 
Material Change As A Consequence Of Takeover 
 
21st Century Fox does not currently have control – de facto or de jure – of Sky. If the takeover were 
to go ahead then it would have 100% control. This would mean a material change in the power of 
21st Century Fox over Sky. 
i. Change in control of shareholdings 

Should Fox take over the remainder of Sky then it would have control of Sky shares. Once in control 
of Sky shares it would be able to use these to influence the direction of Sky, including the 
appointment of Sky Board members. 
ii. Change in control of Board membership 

There are currently 11 members of the Sky Board: 
 3 members from 21st Century Fox – James Murdoch, Chase Carey (non-executive 
director) and John Nallen (non-executive director) 
 2 Sky executives - Jeremy Darroch and Andrew Griffith 
 4 independent non-executive directors 
 1 ‘senior independent director’ - Andrew Sukawaty 
 1 independent deputy chairman - Martin Gilbert (Aberdeen Asset Management) 
There is therefore a majority of independent members and only three members directly from 21st 
Century Fox. The membership of the Board could be changed, and the independent members 
replaced, should the Fox bid go through. 
When reviewing whether Sky was ‘fit and proper’ to hold a broadcast licence, Ofcom stated that 
the membership of the Sky Board was material to its decision, and took account of the 
independent members and of James Murdoch’s decision to step down as Chairman.1 
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Section 2 
Regulatory Framework and Public Interest 
Grounds for Referral 
 
i. The regulatory framework 

From the first Royal Commission on the Press in 1949 to the White Paper which preceded the 
2003 Communications Act (CA03), governments of all persuasions, and Parliament have made 
repeated commitments to the vital importance to democracy of a plural media and the dangers of 
concentrations of media ownership. This philosophy was reaffirmed during the passage of the 
CA03 through amendments to the media mergers regime contained within the 2002 Enterprise 
Act (EA02). The EA02 specifies a number of public interest considerations which are carefully 
drafted to ensure the widest possible definition of plurality.  
Thus, the legislation empowers the Secretary of State to intervene if she believes “that it is or 
may be the case that one or more public interest considerations are relevant” (section 42 (2)). 
Section 58 then details relevant public interest considerations, including national security, 
accurate presentation of news and free expression of opinion in newspapers, and a “sufficient 
plurality of views” in newspaper markets.  
Further section 58 considerations are then articulated in the following terms: 
(a) the need, in relation to every different audience in the United Kingdom…. for there to be a 
sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media enterprises serving that audience (italics 
added); 
(b) the need for the availability throughout the United Kingdom of a wide range of broadcasting 
which (taken as a whole) is both of high quality and calculated to appeal to a wide variety of 
tastes and interests; and 
(c) the need for persons carrying on media enterprises, and for those with control of such 
enterprises, to have a genuine commitment to the attainment in relation to broadcasting of the 
standards objectives set out in section 319 of the Communications Act 2003.’ 
Crucially, section 42 (2) offers even more discretion for intervention than is detailed on the face of 
the Act: “For the purposes of this Part a public interest consideration is a consideration which, at 
the time of the giving of the intervention notice concerned, is specified in section 58 or is not so 
specified but, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, ought to be so specified.” (italics added). 
Public interest considerations are therefore not restricted to those listed in section 58, though the 
Secretary of State would be required to seek parliamentary approval for any new public interest 
considerations. 
ii. Public interest considerations relevant to this merger 

There are specific reasons why the broad public interest considerations outlined above are highly 
relevant to this merger: 
Accuracy. Current anxieties about the proliferation of “fake news”, foreign intervention in 
democratic process, and the growing urgency for verified facts to inform democratic debate give 
this consideration more cogency. Any risk that this merger might pose to journalistic standards of 
accuracy would need to be addressed.  
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Free expression of opinion. Media mergers engage free expression concerns where they impact 
the ability of media enterprises and individual journalists to express a plurality of views. Until 
there is clarity on the restructured management and editorial control systems in the reformed 
Fox/News Corp/Sky suite of companies it is impossible to assess these concerns. Guarantees of 
editorial independence should be an absolute minimum. 
 
Plurality of views within each market. This will require analysis of what constitutes sufficiency, 
and modelling of the current state of plurality in an increasingly consolidated media environment. 
This is particularly true in local markets where commercial radio news is now almost entirely 
dominated by Sky. 
 
Commitment to broadcasting standards. Owners of media enterprises must have a genuine 
commitment to standards objectives set out in section 319 of the Communications Act, including 
accuracy and impartiality. We note that Ofcom conducted a ‘fit and proper person’ test with 
regard to James Murdoch in 2012 and found that his direction of BSkyB “repeatedly fell short of 
the conduct to be expected of him as a chief executive officer and chairman”, although Sky 
overall met the fit and proper test2. Furthermore, James Murdoch specifically referred to 
Broadcasting Act standards objectives in his 2009 McTaggart Lecture as ‘authoritarianism’.3 
These raise legitimate prima facie concerns about a commitment to accepted UK standards 
which merit independent investigation.  
iii. The decision making process 

At this stage, the Secretary of State is only required to reach a fair assessment, on the basis of 
the evidence before her, of whether public interest concerns might be valid. It is not so much a 
question of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as ‘within reasonable doubt’. If any doubts remain about 
the possibility of public interest considerations being engaged in relation to this merger, the 
Secretary of State should refer it to Ofcom for independent review while setting out in broad 
terms the nature of the public interest considerations. 
In our view, given the history of the parties involved in this merger and the concerns being raised 
by a number of stakeholders, failure to give an intervention notice is almost certain to be liable to 
judicial review on the basis of irrationality, or illegality for example on the grounds that the 
decision was not made to a quasi-judicial standard. 
In his 2012 report, Lord Justice Leveson made the following recommendation for referring media 
mergers: 
I recommend that, before making a referral decision, the Secretary of State should 
consult relevant parties as to the arguments for and against a referral, and should be 
required to make public his reasons for reaching a decision one way or the other. This 
would provide a buffer against the criticism that a referral might be made for purely 
political reasons, and offer a welcome degree of transparency as to the concerns that 
have led to any referral. 
These recommendations remain valid, and should be followed closely by the government as 
good practice in relation to this referral decision.  
Arguments have been advanced by supporters of this merger that it should be waved through 
without scrutiny because the media landscape has been transformed since News Corp’s bid for 
full control of Sky in 2010. In particular, they argue that a) new digital intermediaries and 
aggregators such as Facebook and Google have increasingly displaced traditional broadcasters 
and newspapers as the main distributors of news; and b) declining newspaper circulations and 
the growing power of social media should vitiate concerns around media plurality. We do not 
agree, and the following two sections provide more specific empirical arguments as to why there 
are good public interest grounds for an intervention notice. 
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Section 3 
Reduced Plurality of News Production 
 
i. Decline of news production 

News production includes news gathering, video/audio recording-writing-editing-design and 
publishing, as well as distribution. If there are fewer news organisations producing news there will, 
de facto, be less diversity in news production. Similarly, if there is less news production capacity 
within each news organisation – fewer journalists doing journalism as well as editing and publishing 
news – there will be less diversity in news production. As a consequence the public, politicians, 
parties and public bodies will rely more heavily on fewer, sparser news organisations. Those news 
organisations remaining will consequently have more political influence. 
Over the last five years most major UK news organisations have reduced their news production 
capacity. 100 of the 160 journalists at the Independent and Independent on Sunday were expected 
to lose their jobs after the print newspapers closed in March 2016.4  Also in March 2016 the 
Guardian announced plans to cut 250 jobs, 100 of them editorial,5 with plans to reduce the number 
of positions further.6  This represents a significant proportion of the Guardian’s reported 968 core 
editorial staff in 2015.7  In May 2016 The Telegraph Group, whose broadsheets employ about 660 
journalists and editorial staff, announced a further wave of redundancies.8  The group had 
announced 80 editorial job cuts in March 2013, and another 55 in October 2014.9    
In the UK local press the decline in the number of journalists and editorial staff has been even more 
dramatic. ‘Three of the four main local news groups have reported significant reductions in staff, 
including editorial staff, over the last five years’.10  The number of journalists is believed to have 
fallen, Press Gazette reports, ‘by at least half, from 13,000, since 2008’.11  
‘In Northern Ireland’, Mike Gilson, previously editor of the Brighton Argus, told the Press Gazette in 
January 2017, ‘the government employs 160 press officers, more than the entire number of private 
sector journalists working in the province’. The situation is such, Gilson went on, that ‘whole areas of 
life that should be public and debated and questioned are now in danger of disappearing from public 
consciousness. Town halls, trust boards, courts, quangos all going about their business 
unhampered by tiresome questions with no light being shone in the corners. We are in danger of 
losing the ability to hold people to account, speak up for the powerless, those lost in the systems’.12  
News production capacity is shrinking across the UK news media industry, with a consequent 
negative impact on the nature and range of public interest news reporting and plurality. This has 
numerous negative democratic implications. It means, for example, less reporting of local 
authorities, courts and public bodies. It means that the press is less able to perform its role as a 
‘scarecrow’ – monitoring public life and raising the alarm when there is evidence of malpractice or 
corruption. It means that the public are not made aware of developments in public services – both 
positive and negative. There may be more content published online, but if this is for the purpose of 
marketing or entertainment then it does not address the public need for media plurality. 
The proposed merger will lead to a further reduction in the plurality of news production in the UK, 
and a consequent increase in the influence of fewer owners – specifically the owners of Fox and 
News Corp.  
ii. Production vs distribution of news  

Media consumption tells us little about whether diverse media are being produced, nor whether 
public expectations of, and democratic needs for, news are being met. More importantly, it blurs the 
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growing distinction between media distribution and production. 
Prior to the digital era, most news organisations controlled both production and distribution. Major 
newspaper publishers produced news and distributed it via its print newspapers and subsequently 
via its branded websites. Yet, since the popularisation of the internet, and particularly of social 
media, there has been a substantial shift in the way in which people consume news (as illustrated in 
consecutive Reuters Institute Digital News Reports). We know, for example, that 28% of young 
people across 26 countries now rely on social media platforms as their main source of news.13 This 
does not, of course, mean that these young people rely on social media platforms to produce the 
news, just that they rely on social media as distribution platforms for news produced by other 
individuals and organisations. 
This shift to news consumption via technology platforms increases the importance of news 
production rather than consumption as a plurality variable. Knowing that many people use Facebook 
as ‘their main source of news’ does not tell us anything about news plurality, since all the public 
interest news they are consuming on Facebook could come from one provider. Moreover, since the 
technology platforms do not produce news themselves, the dynamics of influence over the political 
process are necessarily different. 
iii. News production capacity within Fox and News UK 

In 2016 Sky employed more than 25,000 people across the UK and Ireland.14 It is not clear what 
proportion of these work at Sky TV or Sky News. Sky News is, when one takes both radio and 
television into account, the dominant commercial producer of broadcast news across the UK. 
In radio, almost every UK commercial station receives its national and international news from Sky 
News Radio (though often supplemented by some locally sourced news). This equates to more than 
280 commercial stations across the UK. Sky’s only real competitor in radio news production is the 
BBC.  
In television there are only two UK-based 24-hour television news channels – Sky News and the 
BBC News Channel. The BBC considered closing or merging its news channel last year, a decision 
which has been shelved for the time being but which demonstrates the vulnerability of BBC news to 
progressive cuts in BBC funding. The prospect of closure could be reopened at any time. ITN 
produces news for ITV and Channel 4, but no longer broadcasts a 24-hour news channel. A 
successful Fox takeover would essentially mean that the UK television news production market 
would be split between three companies, in addition to a duopolistic market in the production of 24-
hour television news (where Sky would be the only commercial provider). 
Sky also dominates UK provision of pay-TV. By mid-2016 it had over 11 million UK subscribers. 
Virgin Media, by contrast had less than 4 million UK subscribers in 2016, and BT less than 2 million. 
The ability to control and direct these resources across these dominant broadcast channels goes 
directly to the question of media plurality. 
When evaluating the public interest of this proposed merger, it is also necessary to take into account 
the news production capacity of News UK, the UK press arm of News Corporation and therefore 
under the direct control of the Murdoch family. 
In 2013 News UK employed ‘around 2,600 [people] in operations spanning journalism, printing, 
distribution and back-office support across the UK’.15 Though no figures are available for the number 
of editorial staff at each News UK outlet, based on this figure News UK remains one of the largest 
news producers in the UK outside the BBC. By comparison, Buzzfeed UK had 80 UK staff in late 
November 2016, including senior management.16 
Should Fox gain complete control of Sky News, the Murdoch’s would therefore control directly the 
dominant commercial news producer in the UK across television, radio and print. 
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iv. News production as a measure of media plurality 

Plurality of news production goes directly to the original purposes of media plurality as set out by 
Ofcom in 2015, namely: 
 informed citizens who are able to access and consume a wide range of viewpoints across a 
variety of platforms and media owners; 
 preventing too much influence over the political process being exercised by any one media 
owner. 
In the digital era, diversity of news production has become an increasingly critical indicator of media 
plurality. Much of the infinite content that is published online is not UK public interest news, nor is it 
intended to be. 
Given the reduction in the plurality of news production that would result from this takeover, and 
given the long history of involvement by the owners of Fox and News Corporation in the production 
and direction of news, we believe this are further compelling grounds for a public interest 
intervention by the Secretary of State.  
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Section 4 
Assessing power and impact in a media merger 
 
i. The principle of power 

At the heart of any decision on media ownership lies the concept of power. It is a fundamental 
principle of all democracies that the exercise of power must not become concentrated within a 
small group of individuals or organisations. This principle is not confined to the exercise of power 
over public opinion, but extends to power and influence over elite decision-makers.  
Thus, approaches to media ownership which focus narrowly on opinion formation ignores the 
damage which can be inflicted by concentrations of media power in other ways: for example, 
over policy makers and the legislative agenda of Parliament; over policy thinkers and opinion-
formers in dictating new ideas and driving change: over the judiciary, on issues around 
sentencing policy and approaches to criminal justice; and over relevant regulators, exerting both 
legal and editorial pressure to demand favourable decisions. 
This definition of media power was explicitly included in Ofcom’s advice to the Culture Secretary 
in June 2012, when it defined plurality with reference to the “desired outcomes of a plural market” 
and proposed two overarching principles: 
 Ensuring there is a diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across and within 
media enterprises. 
 Preventing any one media owner or voice having too much influence over public opinion 
and the political agenda.17 (bold in original, italics added) 
These principles, described by Ofcom as “the two proxies we have for a plural market”, were 
adopted by the government in its 2013 consultation and have been widely accepted in the UK as 
a fair operational definition of the democratic underpinnings of media plurality. 
The dangers of excessive influence concentrated in one corporate owner are particularly acute 
when there is long-standing historical evidence of how power has been exercised through both 
editorial and political influence. This is certainly true of News Corporation and Rupert Murdoch, 
whose biographers, editors and senior executives – as well as several British politicians – have 
provided copious evidence over the years of how he has sought to exercise that influence over 
both public opinion and the political agenda through control of information sources.  
One study demonstrated how, following News Corporation’s takeover of the Wall Street Journal 
ten years ago – despite guarantees of editorial independence – there was a marked ideological 
shift in its editorial agenda.18 Such editorial direction is never a matter of direct instruction, but 
introduced through personnel selection and indirect pressure. One of his earliest biographers, 
William Shawcross relates how one of Rupert Murdoch’s editors described him as running his 
empire “by phone and by clone”.19 Another senior corporate figure involved in News 
Corporation’s China business has explained how Murdoch 
very rarely issued directives or instructions to his senior executives or editors. Instead, … 
he would make known his personal viewpoint on a certain matter. What was expected in 
return, at least from those seeking tenure of any length in the Murdoch Empire, was a sort 
of ‘anticipatory compliance’.20 
One powerful example emerged at the Leveson Inquiry, when former Prime Minister Sir John 
Major testified that Rupert Murdoch had clearly linked his support for the Conservatives at the 
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1997 general election with the party’s position on Europe:  
If we [the Conservative Party] couldn’t change our European policies then his papers 
could not and would not support the Conservative government. As I recall, he used the 
word ‘we’ when referring to his newspapers, he didn’t make the usual nod towards 
editorial independence. 
Another frequently cited example is how, in 2003, all 173 News Corporation newspapers 
worldwide supported the Iraq war.21 
There is an important commercial element to this aspect of power. Despite Rupert Murdoch’s 
insistence at the Leveson Inquiry that “we have never pushed our commercial interests in our 
newspapers”, News Corporation has long demonstrated an understanding of how its media 
properties can enhance its worldwide commercial activities, calling on a huge editorial presence 
to mobilise interest in new product launches, pricing innovations, major sports contracts or 
Hollywood movies. An example emerged in 2010 when an Australian News Corp executive 
reportedly told an advertising conference about a strategy to make sure that News Corp media 
outlets – including its television stations – would prominently feature Fox Studio movies while 
excluding coverage of rival studios. This story was not reported in either of News Corp’s UK 
papers the Sun or the Times.22 
For these reasons, it would be entirely wrong for the Secretary of State, in making a decision 
about a referral to Ofcom, to be distracted by the proliferation of online and social media outlets 
or by an apparent fragmentation of audience share within the mainstream media. Careful 
consideration must also be given to the impact of greater dominance which the proposed 
takeover will afford the Murdoch family as ultimate controllers of both News Corp and Fox.  
ii. Impact and its component parts 

In its measurement framework, Ofcom proposes three criteria for assessing a news media 
market’s plurality; availability, consumption and impact. It concludes that availability metrics “offer 
limited insight and on their own are not sufficient”. The regulator itself therefore rightly warns 
against placing too much weight on emerging but mostly unfrequented online sites which are 
often little more than opportunities for individuals or groups to voice strongly held opinions. 
Ofcom places greater emphasis on consumption, and has attempted to overcome the problem of 
cross-media use in a convergent environment through its own bespoke “Share of References” 
scheme, first employed for its public interest test of News Corp’s proposed takeover of BSkyB in 
2010. While superficially attractive in attempting to deal with measurement across media, we 
believe this approach to be flawed as a means of establishing how media power is distributed in 
the UK23. It can certainly not be treated as a sufficient indicator of media power in isolation from 
Ofcom’s third category, impact. 
It is this criterion which, in broadest sense, is the best proxy for the exercise of power and which, 
in the case of News Corporation’s bid for the whole of Sky, requires thorough investigation. In 
terms of this proposed acquisition, there are three aspects of impact which need proper 
exploration.  
a. Impact on public opinion formation.  
As has long been acknowledged in the field of sociological “effects” studies, it is never possible to 
make precise inferences about how and precisely which media contribute to shaping political 
attitudes and opinions. While Ofcom has attempted to introduce quantitative “proxies” in its 
measurement approach, it recognises that these are inadequate in isolation and must be 
complemented by more qualitative measures which would be tailored to any individual bid. Any 
such approach would need to recognise, in particular, the ability of those with significant control 
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over mainstream media news publications to act as gatekeepers for news and opinion 
dissemination. 
This applies particularly to the printed (or electronic) word, because broadcasting is subject to 
heavy impartiality regulation. Britain’s national newspapers, in particular, have a long tradition of 
being highly partisan, and its popular press frequently elides news and comment (an issue raised 
often by politicians during their evidence to the Leveson inquiry).  While impassioned, one-sided 
argument is an integral element of a free press, it is also intuitively more likely to shape opinions 
than the carefully balanced and detached approach of broadcasters. Given News Corporation’s 
continuing domination of newspaper circulation, further expansion of its power should be a prima 
facie cause for concern. 
b. Impact on news agendas 
Established print news brands have considerable power to set news agendas both for 
broadcasters and for online news sites which have limited newsgathering resources. There is 
evidence from both the 2015 general election and the 2016 EU Referendum that broadcasters 
were heavily influenced by the front page editorialising of the UK’s press, which in turn was 
heavily dominated by vociferous pro-Leave campaigning both in choice of stories and in editorial 
comment.  
In June 2014, when working as the BBC’s Economics Editor, Robert Peston expressed 
frustration at the way in which BBC News was, in his view, “completely obsessed by the agenda 
set by newspapers”. He continued: “The safest thing is to go with what the newspapers are going 
with, even at a time when the influence and power of newspapers is radically declining.”24 When 
asked to comment on Peston’s view the following week Head of Sky News John Ryley said: “I 
have always been shocked from the very first time I started in [TV] news at the reliance on 
newspapers.”25  
In addition, the influence of newspaper agendas is manifested directly in the proliferating 
newspaper reviews across all channels: twice each evening on the Sky and BBC News channels, 
at the end of every edition of Newsnight, on Marr’s Sunday morning show and frequently 
identified and discussed on the BBC’s Daily Politics on TV and Today programme on radio. Sky 
News, the BBC and ITV all tweet the front pages of next day’s national newspapers every 
evening, and their programmes rarely if at all feature online-only publications such as Buzzfeed, 
Huffington Post and Vice News. Once again, therefore, broadcast agendas are dominated by 
daily print publications, where News Corporation titles continue to hold a commanding position. 
This can only be exacerbated where the same organisation is entirely responsible for the editorial 
output of Sky News and – following its acquisition by News Corporation – the national 
commercial radio station TalkSport.  
c. Impact on policy formation 
Third, there is the potential power to influence government ministers, parliamentarians, senior 
civil servants, regulators and others responsible for developing and implementing public policy. 
Analysis by the Media Reform Coalition of meetings between Rupert Murdoch and his senior 
executives and senior government ministers has demonstrated that they met twenty times in the 
18 months from April 2015 to September 2016, including ten meetings with the Prime Minister or 
Chancellor. A further eight were with the Culture Secretary.26  
The sheer scale of such direct access to government – which exceeds that of every other media 
organisation, including the BBC – has clear implications for the exercise of power over politicians 
and policy makers. Such influence applies both to policy making of direct commercial and 
competitive interest to News Corp and Fox, and more widely to policy areas in which News Corp 
media have expressed strong views.  
Thus, in his 2013 book Democracy Under Attack, former Guardian journalist Malcolm Dean 
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demonstrated through a series of case studies how press influence operates in social policy 
areas including law and order, drugs and asylum seekers.27 In his analysis of the phone-hacking 
scandal, Nick Davies (the journalist most responsible for its exposure) has suggested that Labour 
Party policies which included the buying in of private medical businesses by the National Health 
Service and a diluted form of “Sarah’s Law” – the publication of names and addresses of 
convicted sex offenders – resulted directly from discussions with key figures at Murdoch’s Sun 
and News of the World newspapers.28  
d. Impact on commercial environment for news media 
With the dramatic reduction of print advertising, and with digital advertising increasingly 
dominated by Google and Facebook, the sustainability of news media will depend increasingly on 
paid relationships (subscriptions or pay per access). Full acquisition of Sky will enhance Fox and 
News Corp’s ability to combine with Sky to offer discounted subscriptions and maximise 
revenues through direct payment, thereby disadvantaging independent competitors and 
ultimately reducing available news plurality. While contracting behaviour between Sky and News 
Corp subsidiaries predates the proposed transaction – for example, Sky Sports’ exclusive 
distribution partnership with News UK makes Premier League clips available across The Sunday 
Times, The Times and The Sun digital services – full ownership of Sky can only increase the 
incentive for these businesses to collaborate much more closely. 
These economies of scale and cross-fertilisation across platforms and media outlets will be 
further enhanced by Sky’s platform as the second largest Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the 
UK and an emerging playing in the mobile market.29 At the moment, all ISPs are covered by 
European rules of net neutrality which prevent them from engaging in differential pricing. Once 
these rules are repatriated to the UK, it is entirely possible that Ofcom will come under pressure 
from Fox and News Corp to abandon the principle of net neutrality, thereby allowing Sky 
customers privileged cheaper access to Fox and News Corp media products.  
The consequences for plurality across all genres of media output – from news and information to 
TV drama and film – could be profound. 
Evidence from senior politicians to module 3 of the Leveson Inquiry provided abundant evidence 
of how unduly powerful media corporations influence policy and regulatory decisions by exerting 
pressure on governments. Four successive prime ministers admitted, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that they were bound too closely to News Corporation and Rupert Murdoch. When the same 
company is seeking to consolidate and expand its sphere of influence through complete control 
over one of the most influential broadcasters in the country, we believe it is incumbent on the 
Culture Secretary to ask for an independent analysis of the implications for those organisations’ 
power and influence over the media environment.  
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Closing remarks 
 
This short policy brief is not intended to be a detailed examination of the plurality concerns raised 
by Fox’s bid to take over the remaining 61% of Sky. It is intended to illustrate the range of 
significant reasons why this bid raises significant plurality concerns, and to highlight the broad 
discretion the Secretary of State has when making a decision whether to refer the bid to Ofcom. 
Once a public interest intervention notice has been issued then there will be greater opportunity 
to make more detailed analyses and submissions as to the potential impact of the takeover. 
The authors of this note are amongst those who believe such an opportunity is necessary and 
warranted. 
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